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Poland: A Balance Sheet for Jaruzelski

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An Intelligence Assessment

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*EUR 84-10131
June 1984*

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An Intelligence Assessment

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Key Judgments

*Information available
as of 13 June 1984
was used in this report*

Since imposing martial law on 13 December 1980, party leader Jaruzelski has shattered organized opposition to the government, overcome internal resistance to some of his key policies, and fortified his personal position. He has also minimized opposition from the church, halted the decline in economic growth, and satisfied Moscow's minimum demands for a reassertion of regime control. Nevertheless, the gulf between society and the regime has widened, and he increasingly appears buffeted by traditional patterns of decisionmaking that led to earlier crises.

Jaruzelski believes that if Poland is to break out of its postwar cycle of periodic crises he must create a more effective state apparatus. He favors greater public input into policymaking than pre-1980 Polish leaders and believes economic reform is fundamental to overcoming the economic and political stalemate. He has not shown, however, the skills of Hungary's Kadar in devising specific policies to overcome differing institutional and regional interests and to create a durable social contract with the populace.

Jaruzelski's chances for success depend primarily on whether he can gain better control of the party apparatus and deal with intransigent economic problems. He has had only limited success in bringing his supporters into party positions and has failed to devise a coherent economic strategy. Economic issues are consuming increasingly more of his time and he has resorted to stopgap measures. Lack of control over the party and failure to implement tough and unpopular economic measures will continue to be thorns in his side.

Opposition remains widespread, and the younger "lost" generation remains particularly alienated. The regime's active opponents have mostly given up on the idea that demonstrations can force change, but the estrangement of society runs so deep that the possibility of a popular explosion for apparently inconsequential reasons cannot be taken lightly.

Moscow, despite positive signs in public, is concerned about the slow progress toward restoring the party and the strong role of the church. An escalation of Soviet interference would narrow Jaruzelski's policy options and encourage his critics. The West's ability to influence Jaruzelski directly is exceedingly limited, although he might make some limited concessions in the human rights arena in light of his interest in expanding commercial ties and being admitted to IMF.

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We expect current trends to continue at least through 1985. The fragile stability, however, may be increasingly challenged between 1985 and 1987 as it becomes clear to Jaruzelski that ad hoc measures, especially in economic policy, are not working. A new period of destabilization could come again, a result of resistance within the regime to his reform efforts or from the society as a result of prolonged economic frustration.

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Poland: A Balance Sheet for Jaruzelski

Introduction

Party and government leader Wojciech Jaruzelski has accomplished the principal task for which he was elevated to his current position, that is, restoration of central political control. In rendering organized underground opposition impotent, he has given himself and the regime a breathing spell in which to revive Poland's shattered political, social, and economic life. The tasks of institution building and rehabilitation of the economy are proving to be more difficult, however, than the essentially destructive process of imposing martial law. The gulf between society and the regime has widened and Jaruzelski has been indecisive in charting a new course. Moreover, he increasingly appears to be hemmed in by traditional political forces and patterns of decisionmaking that led to the crisis in 1980 and inclined toward short-term economic and security policies. This Assessment reviews Jaruzelski's successes and failures, outlines his policy agenda, analyzes the political and economic forces confronting him, and suggests scenarios for near- and mid-term developments.

The Successes

Since imposing martial law on 13 December 1981, Jaruzelski can claim a number of successes. He has shattered organized opposition to the government, overcome internal resistance to some of his key policies, fortified his personal position, minimized opposition from the church, halted economic decline, and satisfied Moscow's basic demand for a reassertion of regime control.

Foremost among these has been the destruction of Solidarity as an organized overt political force. The authorities followed a strategy of limited repression that included some localized brutality but avoided massive terror that would have provoked more bitter resistance. No one, for example, was officially executed, and there were only 60 or so deaths resulting from various clashes between the police and demonstrators.¹ The regime's strategy helped destroy the self-confidence of workers that was crucial to the union's

¹ The authorities have been sensitive to the political impact of these deaths. They have, for example, gone to great lengths to give the appearance of a thorough investigation in the case of a student who died while in police custody.



Liaison ©

Figure 1. Party First Secretary
and Premier Wojciech
Jaruzelski.

power and led many to consider most forms of overt resistance futile. The regime's coercive apparatus became so adept at controlling demonstrations, intimidating potential activists, and disrupting underground activity that the government was able to rescind Solidarity's legal status with impunity.

Jaruzelski is not seriously challenged by any of his domestic critics. In addition, he has generally been able to outmaneuver critics of his policies, overcoming, for example, strong resistance to a papal visit in the summer of 1983. At the recent Conference of Party Delegates in March (a mini party congress) his policies were given unqualified support. Institutionally, Jaruzelski has strengthened himself by arranging to be named head of the strengthened National Defense Committee. This organization will play a key role in managing domestic political crises.

Jaruzelski also succeeded in encouraging the church to maintain its traditional role as a moderator of social tension. Harsher regime tactics toward either the church or society would have made it much more difficult for Cardinal Glemp to follow a conciliatory line or to argue that Jaruzelski is a Polish patriot and the best possible alternative. The immediate costs to the regime have been minimal, relegated largely to allowing the Church to expand its already extensive infrastructure. Jaruzelski's handling of church/state issues has, however, irritated Moscow.

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Despite numerous serious economic problems, Jaruzelski has also managed to stem the Polish decline in national income. In 1983, output of manufacturing industries grew, labor productivity increased slightly, and there was a small rise in the standard of living along with somewhat more food and consumer goods for sale in state markets. Jaruzelski has been the first Polish leader to implement successfully major retail price increases. While financial constraints remain a serious burden, Warsaw ran small trade surpluses over the last two years. []

And finally, during his two and a half years as party chief, Jaruzelski has satisfied Moscow's minimum demands for political control. There has been little direct evidence of Soviet concern that a military man heads the party, and almost none to suggest that they have seriously considered withdrawing their political support. Moscow's warm endorsement during his working visit in May 1984 suggests that it considers Jaruzelski the best alternative for the next several years. []

Jaruzelski and His Program


These achievements, however, provide only a tenuous basis for governing the country over the longer term. Although his hardline critics have been forced to the sidelines, Jaruzelski has been indecisive about how to use his breathing spell effectively. Continuing attention to short-term crisis management has overwhelmed any serious search for longer term solutions. []

Jaruzelski, in our opinion, is committed to changing the way the party and government exercise power. He and his moderate advisers think that if Poland is to break out of its postwar cycle of periodic crises, it must have an effective state apparatus that better formulates and implements policy and is more responsive to society's moods. At the core of his thinking is the belief that Poles need and will respect strong and capable central authorities. By his actions he also appears to support greater social input into policy-making than Gierek permitted before 1980, is prepared to give the new trade unions some latitude to criticize government economic policies, and is willing to tolerate a press that carries extensive, frank debates on important subjects. Economic reform, in his view,



Sovfoto ©

Figure 2. Jaruzelski's most influential critics: Foreign Minister Olszowski and Politburo member Milewski. []



CAF ©

Figure 3. Jaruzelski's closest adviser: Czeslaw Kiszczak. []

is fundamental to overcoming the economic and political stalemate.² []

Jaruzelski intends, however, to proceed cautiously.

[] he believes that the road to reform will be long and tortuous.³ []

[] that precipitate concessions made to gain goodwill would make the authorities appear weak and could embolden the

² A clue to Jaruzelski's thinking is contained in his propaganda slogans. From the beginning of martial law he has repeatedly said that "there can be no return to the way things were prior to December 1981 or to August 1980." In practice, this has meant the destruction of the political pluralism of the Solidarity era, but it also indicates he believes the pre-1980 political process was seriously flawed. In saying "the party, the same but not the same," he has indicated his belief that the party's style of rule must be reformed.

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opposition. A tradition-minded Communist, Jaruzelski has firmly indicated that he will not allow a significant diffusion of political power either within the party or from the authorities to society.⁴ [redacted]

Jaruzelski and his advisers clearly would like, over the long run, to emulate Kadar's post-1956 experience in Hungary. However, in our view, the Polish leader has not shown that he has the Kadarian political skills to devise specific policy goals and to overcome differing institutional and regional interests. He is, according to US Embassy sources in Warsaw, very intelligent and willing to listen to his advisers. [redacted]

[redacted] he is probably better equipped mentally than any previous Polish Communist leader, but that his political outlook is "underdeveloped." As a result of his military background, we believe he is not as committed as a civilian party leader to defending the traditional roles and prerogatives of the party apparatus. At the same time, not being "one of the boys" in a political hierarchy held together by personal ties creates opposition no matter what policies he follows. Jaruzelski also is at a disadvantage because with the return to "normality," he cannot as easily use the military as his personnel pool. [redacted] Jaruzelski has the firm support of the military. This backing rests, fundamentally, on their common military background. On the issues, we believe the generals probably are more inclined toward the law and order and other hardline aspects of Jaruzelski's program than toward his modest efforts to reach accommodation. [redacted]

³ Jaruzelski does not have the "easy" policy solutions to overcome the crisis that were available to his predecessors. Wladyslaw Gomulka in 1956 relied, initially, on public enthusiasm for his moderate and Polish-oriented course. Edward Gierk in 1970 promised, and for a time delivered, a higher standard of living. ⁴ Not surprisingly the institutional embodiments of Jaruzelski's effort to reach "national reconciliation" have had little success. Severely disillusioned by the imposition of martial law, Poles do not believe Jaruzelski's assertions that he is following a reform course. Most seem to view the Patriotic Movement for National Renewal (PRON) and the new trade unions as little more than windowdressing for a basically repressive policy. Regime attitudes toward the new electoral law, creative artistic unions, and the universities also demonstrate a conservative political program that has little chance of generating increased legitimacy. In addition, despite the extensive legislation on economic reform, the regime has continued to rely extensively on centralized controls that hold little promise for improving the economy. [redacted]

The Political and Economic Forces

As Jaruzelski searches for a strategy to revive Poland he must maneuver among increasingly assertive and contradictory forces. He faces an increasingly active and potentially hostile party apparatus, a troubled economy, an alienated society, and a more critical Soviet leadership. [redacted]

The Party and Government. We believe Jaruzelski's chances for success will depend most on whether he can gain better control of the party apparatus and improve the efficiency of the state bureaucracy.⁵

Jaruzelski, in our view, clearly recognizes that the party's professional bureaucrats at the central and provincial levels will increasingly demand to be once again the initiator and final arbiter of policy, for both ideological and political reasons. [redacted]

Jaruzelski and his supporters have thus far resisted, not because they are antiparty but because they believe [redacted] that the party bureaucracy's bungling, insensitivity to social moods, and lack of creativity have led to past crises and that, given the opportunity, the apparatus will repeat these mistakes.⁶ [redacted]

[redacted] the general continues to distrust the party and doubts it will gain popular support. Jaruzelski explicitly told party activists in Lublin in February that the party risks being infiltrated by careerists, bureaucrats, and prospectors for unlawful profits. [redacted]

Jaruzelski has had only limited success, however, in bringing his supporters into the party apparatus. He has added only two full members to the 15-man [redacted]

⁵ Jaruzelski seems to agree with Western academics who argue in their analyses of the reasons for Poland's cyclical crises that the traditional way of implementing the "leading role of the party" has led to inflexibility in the face of a changing environment. [redacted]

⁷ Jaruzelski also has publicly praised an official report that, even in its watered-down final version, severely criticizes the Gierk leadership and party apparatus for losing touch with society and making capricious decisions that brought on the workers' rebellion in 1980. [redacted]

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Jaruzelski Seeks Control of the Bureaucrats

Jaruzelski has not been able to introduce either military men—in whom he would place greater trust—or civilian supporters into large numbers of party or government positions. Of the nine powerful party secretaries, excluding Jaruzelski, none comes from the military although five have been appointed since Jaruzelski became party chief. In his most recent appointments, Jaruzelski has chosen party officials with academic credentials, possibly because they were less tainted with the party's previous failures. Of the 17 departments, only three are headed by military men and almost all their deputies are civilian. Two of these departments, however, cadre and foreign affairs, are very important. There has been an almost total turnover of department heads since October 1981, and Jaruzelski probably had some influence in this selection. At the provincial level only one of 49 party first secretaries is a military man, and there has been relatively little turnover among the rest. At the lowest level, turnover of party first secretaries during recent elections was about one-third, but we do not know how many of the new faces support Jaruzelski or his policies. It cannot be assumed that all new appointees are Jaruzelski supporters. He presumably has had to strike deals

with the apparat, and several of the new department heads appear more hardline than Jaruzelski prefers.

On the government side, Jaruzelski appears to have had some greater success in gaining control of the senior positions. Three-quarters of the deputy prime ministers and ministers have received their portfolios since Jaruzelski was named Prime Minister in February 1981. Of this total, only five are generals. At the provincial level, 10 of the 49 governors are military men and in their provinces probably exercise greater influence than the provincial party first secretary. This is particularly noticeable in Gdansk where the governor, General Cygan, clearly outranks the party first secretary. The presence of a military governor in Siedlce, according to a source of the US Embassy, facilitated the resolution in April of the recent widely publicized dispute over the hanging of crosses in a schoolroom. Jaruzelski has also sought to change behavior patterns within the bureaucracy through legislation, but this is not likely to be successful in the short run. A law on government employment has been passed, and a code of ethics and a law on personnel training will soon be considered.

Politburo, and has retained on this body two of his strongest rivals, Foreign Minister Olszowski and former Interior Minister Miroslaw Milewski. His efforts to make extensive personnel changes in other parts of the party bureaucracy have been rebuffed,

by a combination of internal party resistance and Soviet pressure. Jaruzelski would have to remove up to one-quarter of the Central Committee apparatus (that is, approximately 2,000 individuals) to ensure that he can implement his policies.

Jaruzelski supporters will soon try again to reduce and weaken the Central Committee apparatus by merging several departments. Jaruzelski also will attempt to bring several hundred more officers into key party and government positions.

Efforts to weed out party officials have created political problems for Jaruzelski.

some in the party apparatus are considering ways to embarrass Jaruzelski, and

party officials are watching personnel appointments very carefully and seeking to block candidates sponsored by the military.

there has been a dramatic increase in the level of frustration of the party bureaucracy. the bureaucracy is becoming increasingly unruly and activist and pressing for a return to more authoritarian policies.

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Jaruzelski has found some ways to circumvent the party. [redacted]

[redacted] for example, that all major decisions are made by a triumvirate of generals—Jaruzelski, Kiszczak, and Jaruzelski's chef de cabinet Michal Janiszewski—and not the party Politburo. In fact, Jaruzelski appears to be trying to separate more clearly the roles of party and state,⁸ a process that has given the government more power. Now the government initiates as well as executes many policies. [redacted]

Failure to gain control of the party bureaucracy, however, will keep Jaruzelski on the political defensive. Not only can he not count on the apparatus to carry out his policies, but he also must continuously watch for hostile initiatives from critics in the bureaucracy. The central party apparatus, for example, increasingly appears to be setting the pace on some issues (cultural policy, for example), and giving them a distinctly hardline cast. In such an environment Jaruzelski may have an increasingly difficult time ensuring implementation of his programs and is likely to be caught in the middle of problems generated by lower level officials over whom his control is limited. [redacted]

The Economy⁹

Economic problems are consuming a large proportion of Jaruzelski's time, but there are few indications that he or anyone else in Poland has clear ideas on how to resolve them. The economic reform legislation introduced in early 1982 appears dead in the water, and Jaruzelski has waffled on stabilization measures needed to deal with the debt burden for fear of provoking an already hostile populace. [redacted]

⁸ Following each crisis in Poland, the party vowed that it would step back from direct policy implementation and leave this to the government. But this rhetoric was quickly forgotten as party officials found it difficult to implement their "leading role" unless they actually made decisions. This issue is a continuing bone of contention. The moderate Kazimierz Barcikowski, a close supporter of Jaruzelski, stated in early March that the party has forgotten that it exercises power through institutions and state structures and does not exercise authority directly. If the party is held responsible for everything, according to Barcikowski, it will inevitably take the blame for everything. [redacted]

There is opposition to reform from party and government bureaucrats who would lose power, opposition from workers who believe reform merely means increased prices, and a perception in government circles that short-term problems require more centralized controls. In addition [redacted] the government's minister for reform is inept and has been outmaneuvered by officials in the heavy industry and mining industries. Jaruzelski and some of his close supporters, according to contacts of the US Embassy, are left as the only true believers in reform. [redacted]

In lieu of reform Jaruzelski has taken stopgap measures largely involving personnel shifts. Last November, he replaced the economic czar with two men who, according to US Embassy contacts, have broader knowledge of economics and who are stronger supporters of reform. In May, the Ministers of Wages and Heavy Industry were replaced because of shortcomings. He also may be playing a greater role in economic decision making. A Polish official told a US Embassy officer in February that Jaruzelski was going on a three-day retreat to discuss ways to increase producer prices. Probably hoping to break through some of the redtape that encumbers the Polish economy, he has been making more appearances at meetings of economic officials. [redacted]

Jaruzelski appears to be trying to buy time by placating popular concerns. He has cut back on austerity measures out of fear of workers' reaction and has promised increased consumption even though these policies are detrimental to long-term recovery. To satisfy workers' demands for social justice, the regime has increased controls on the private sector and foreign-owned Polonia firms although these actions will hamper efforts to improve consumer supplies. Continuing efforts to avoid further antagonizing an irritated public, in our view, will add to the debt burden and only delay the possibility for a sustainable economic recovery. At the same time, the Polish consumer will enjoy only marginal gains, still leaving Jaruzelski without the political stability that he is trying to buy. [redacted]

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Figure 4. The "lost" generation.

Newsweek ©

Opposition ¹⁰

The authorities may have broken the back of Solidarity and the organized underground, but the gulf between the society and the regime has probably never been wider in Poland's Communist history. Opposition takes both a passive and active form. A relatively large proportion of the society—what Deputy Prime Minister Rakowski calls the silent center—has simply turned its back on the regime. Included here is the younger, "lost" generation about which the authorities have shown so much concern. This generation refuses to join the party or other official social organizations. Of the party's 2.1 million members, only 260,000 are under 30—the lowest figure in party history. Also of concern to the authorities are workers who refuse to participate in unions or the party and who decline any kind of responsible positions. This "center" also includes a large proportion of intellectuals who refuse to join the new professional organizations. [redacted]

Such passive resistance may be seen by some Polish officials, particularly the hardliners, as preferable to active opposition, but it severely constrains Jaruzelski.

[redacted]

At a time when the regime needs cooperation to revive the economy, the society will not listen to inspirational appeals or well-reasoned arguments.¹¹ Such a society may quietly accept humiliation and deprivation and then, for apparently inconsequential reasons, explode in anger without much warning.¹² [redacted]

Although senior Polish officials claim that active opposition is no longer a threat, the level of protest remains high by pre-1980 as well as East European standards. It runs the gamut from minor sabotage and threatening letters to local officials to limited strikes and demonstrations. The organized underground continues to exist in the form of small uncoordinated clandestine groups in many factories. Their activities, according to underground as well as Embassy contacts, focus on the collection of dues to aid victims of government repression and the publishing of uncensored information.¹³ The primary purpose of the underground press is to keep morale high by passing information about local conditions and pressing demands for better working conditions and repeal of repressive laws. These publications increasingly reflect the sentiment that open, possibly violent, confrontation with the authorities leads nowhere and that the movement must wait for a more propitious time.

[redacted]

¹¹ The authorities, including Jaruzelski, often seem baffled by such phenomena and try to counter it with the argument that it is in the Poles' own economic interest to work better and harder. But the alienation caused by economic and political frustrations cannot be overcome with mere words. Poles have heard such promises before and found them to be sterile. [redacted]

¹² The alienation has also resulted in an increase in socially negative behavior and a breakdown in social and worker discipline. There has been a noted increase in absenteeism, alcoholism, drug addiction, and crime. According to the Prosecutor General, for example, there was a considerable increase in robbery, rape, and burglary in 1982. [redacted]

¹³ Underground publishing is a large-scale business. One publishing house, Krag, for example, published at least 13 full-length books with an initial print run for each of 6,000 to 10,000 copies in 1983. Recent efforts by the security services may have cut this down somewhat. Solidarity supporters in the West claim that there are 20 underground publications appearing regularly in the Gdansk area alone and 13 in Szczecin. [redacted]

[redacted] there are 10 "printing houses" in Krakow, many of which are merely a room with a poor mimeograph machine. Clandestine radiobroadcasts from Radio Solidarity are also transmitted in the larger cities sporadically. [redacted]

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The underground is also trying to keep alive a sense of protest by creating an "alternative society," that is, social, professional, and cultural organizations outside the control of the government. Embassy sources say that unofficial theater, cabarets, art shows, private discussion sessions, and lectures are thriving. In addition, the debates continue about whether the opposition should change its tactics of avoiding government institutions and seek, instead, to infiltrate them. There is still widespread opposition to the latter because any form of participation is criticized as collaborationist and giving legitimacy to the regime. Nevertheless, according to US Embassy contacts, there has been some recent interest by Solidarity activists in trying to influence the new trade unions and self-management bodies. [redacted]

Lech Walesa's behavior reflects much that is typical of Polish society. He has stated to the Western press as well as to Embassy officers that he opposes violent demonstrations, but he has clearly not given up his effort to maintain a spirit of resistance as was shown by his participation in demonstrations on 1 May. He is searching for a way to influence regime decisions, has not yet found it, but remains convinced that the authorities eventually will have to deal with him or other true representatives of society to resolve Poland's economic problems. His effort this spring to put forth a positive economic program fell flat, however, because of disagreements among his advisers. [redacted]

The existence of this opposition lessens the regime's freedom of action. It has weakened government control over information, which means that the authorities, when making decisions, must anticipate possible scrutiny at home and abroad. The opposition also acts as a focal point for economic grievances, generates specific antigovernment activities such as demonstrations or the boycott of local elections, and more generally distracts the authorities from resolving Poland's problems. The regime is compelled to devote considerable resources to combating the opposition, which we believe probably increases the weight of the security services in decisionmaking. Meanwhile, Jaruzelski remains vulnerable to criticism from Moscow and other East Europeans for failing to eliminate opposition. [redacted]



Figure 5. Lech Walesa and friends infiltrate May Day parade. [redacted]

Moscow. Jaruzelski continues to emphasize that Poland must establish closer ties with the Soviet Union, a position that we believe is more than just a propaganda theme to please Moscow. [redacted]

[redacted] he considers that his honor and Poland's national dignity were impugned by Western criticism of martial law. He appears to realize that normalizing relations with the West on his terms will be an extended process, and thus his "turn to the East" is not only personal but a necessity.¹⁴ [redacted]

We believe that Moscow is increasingly impatient at the slow pace of normalization and that the Soviets are pressing harder for policies more to their liking. [redacted]

[redacted] before Andropov's death, the Soviet leadership was largely dissatisfied with Jaruzelski's performance and policies, had vetoed personnel changes Jaruzelski sought to make in the party apparatus, and wanted Jaruzelski to begin an antichurch campaign. Moscow

¹⁴ During his visit to Moscow in May, Jaruzelski signed a long-term scientific and economic cooperation agreement with the Soviets. The agreement, as published, lacks detail, and tough bargaining lies ahead on specific implementing proposals. We do not know how much impact this agreement will have in integrating the two economies. [redacted]

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Figure 6. Jaruzelski and Soviet leader Chernenko during Jaruzelski's visit in May to the Soviet Union

reportedly threatened to cut off supplies of cotton, oil, and other consumer goods if Jaruzelski refused.

We doubt, however, that Moscow is pressing for rapid dramatic changes in its relationship with Poland or in Warsaw's domestic policies. Over the years Moscow has come to live with such Polish idiosyncracies as a strong private sector and an influential church. It seems unlikely to us that the new Soviet leadership is ready to deal with the political and economic turmoil that would come from the pursuit of a dramatically tougher domestic line by Polish authorities. In the same vein, we do not believe that the Soviets would stand in the way of Poland's expanding its trade ties with the West so long as Jaruzelski does not repeat

¹⁵ Soviet pressure on the Poles also reportedly affects military cooperation. There is reason to believe that Polish Defense Minister Siwicki was pressed to allow additional Soviet forces to be stationed in Poland, and to increase integration with the Soviet army.

Gierek's hapless policies or make too many political concessions. Such ties may even be seen as relieving some of the pressure for Soviet economic help. Moscow is not likely, in our view, to shoulder in any significant way Poland's economic problems despite the increased talk of a "turn to the East."

We believe that Moscow, rather than trying to enforce new orthodoxy on the Poles, probably is seeking to prevent the institutionalization of additional non-conformist policies. Soviet hackles probably are raised by Warsaw's negotiations with the church on a variety of issues—including a church proposal for aiding private agriculture—that could be seen as establishing unwelcome precedents. Soviet pressure is likely to have played a role in slowing progress on such issues.

Increasing Soviet interference in Polish policymaking probably will narrow Jaruzelski's policy options, particularly toward the church. Moreover, Soviet pressure may increase the prospects that Jaruzelski's hardliner opponents will more actively criticize him or undertake actions that he cannot easily disavow.

The Church.¹⁶ Jaruzelski, we believe, recognizes the value of the church in preserving order. Although the church has become more involved in political, economic, and social activities and has extended its moral and material support to the opposition, church leaders have steadfastly resisted pressure—from some of the more radical lower clergy and the underground—to turn their moral authority into political opposition to Jaruzelski. Instead they have worked to maintain the social peace, reflecting an assessment, according to the US Embassy, that Jaruzelski can be dealt with, that he is not a Soviet puppet, and that the likely alternative to his rule would be much worse for the church and Poland. The church leadership, according to Embassy contacts, is aware that its ability to influence the regime on major issues is limited. Since

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its early attempts in the spring of 1982 to suggest alternate paths to national reconciliation were brusquely rebuffed, the church has turned to mediation of specific problems between the society and authorities. Jaruzelski may use the church's strength as an argument against more repressive policies [redacted]

The West. The West's ability to influence Jaruzelski directly is exceedingly limited although he clearly has the West in mind in certain policy decisions. We believe Jaruzelski wants two things from the West: respect and economic assistance. Through the removal of sanctions and resumption of more normal political and economic ties, he hopes to remove the stigma placed on Poland as a result of martial law. The improvement of commercial ties and admittance to the IMF probably are seen as necessary to revitalize the economy, especially in light of Soviet inability and unwillingness to supply what the Poles need. In exchange, we believe Jaruzelski is willing to make limited concessions in human rights, especially if this will further normalization. Most recently, he clearly was unwilling to press ahead with trials of 11 former Solidarity activists out of concern for the publicity this would generate in the West. The partial reversal of this policy was due, we believe, to frustration at the refusal of some of these leaders to compromise, Soviet pressure, and to Jaruzelski's belief that neither Western governments nor banks will be forthcoming with significant help in the near term.¹⁷ He also has been willing to proceed—although slowly—with creating a legal structure for a church plan to aid private agriculture with Western resources. The Poles' staggering debt to the West constrains Polish economic thinking and planning, but recent Polish actions on prices and wages show that Warsaw views the servicing of its foreign debt as only one—and not the most important—of its many economic problems. [redacted]

Prospects

The Next 18 Months. We expect current political and economic trends to continue at least through 1985.¹⁸

¹⁷ The authorities told the lawyers for four of the 11 in early June that the trial would begin on 13 July in a military court and last until October. [redacted]

¹⁸ This date was chosen as a minor benchmark because the Poles have designated the period from the end of martial law on 22 July 1983 until 31 December 1985 as the "Period of Overcoming the Socioeconomic Crisis." At the end of 1985 the regime will have to review temporary legislation on trade unions, the educational system, and economic enterprises and will have to assess progress in fulfilling a special economic plan. [redacted]

We believe it unlikely that in this time Jaruzelski will give up the post of prime minister since he considers this as an important instrument for reshaping the government. He is even less likely to give up the party leadership voluntarily since the professional party apparatus will probably remain the focal point of resistance to his policies. To our knowledge he has no serious health problems and at 60 he is young by Soviet and East European standards. [redacted]

We believe Jaruzelski will make some headway in placing more loyal people in key party and government positions—despite stiff opposition from the affected bureaucracies—but his successes will not be sufficient to overcome resistance to economic reform or to significantly cut the inefficiency of the bureaucracies. He is likely to come under greater internal pressure and criticism when, not if, the economy fails to improve. [redacted]

The prospects are exceedingly dim for any significant improvement in the economy in this period largely because there is little reason to believe that either the East or West will provide the inputs that the Polish economy needs, that economic reforms will be implemented, or that Jaruzelski will have the political courage to implement needed stabilization measures. Indeed, the best that Jaruzelski can hope for is that the economy will continue to stumble along at its current pace. This may be increasingly difficult, however, as failure to deal with deep-seated economic constraints, the debt problems, and the disaffected populace will combine to prevent a sustained improvement in economic performance. A crop failure would require Jaruzelski to make a very difficult decision about diverting scarce hard currency to agricultural imports. [redacted]

The alienation of society will remain a serious problem but not enough, in our view, to threaten regime control. The regime will continue its tough line toward active opposition out of fear that concessions would be interpreted as weakness. There are likely to be some strikes and demonstrations but these will mostly be sporadic and uncoordinated. The issues most likely to spark job actions will be prices and wages. Meanwhile, opposition efforts to create an "alternate society" will continue. In our judgment, it seems likely

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that Moscow will continue its pressure on the Poles and that Warsaw will react with episodic efforts to root out the remnants of the organized underground. Also, Polish leaders are likely to proceed slowly, if at all, on Church/state issues. [redacted]

Beyond 1985. Poland's fragile stability, however, may increasingly be challenged, even though the history of Eastern Europe since the war has been one in which many regimes faced with social opposition have managed to muddle through. Destabilization could be triggered by political infighting within the leadership or by an upsurge of social frustrations. We believe that Jaruzelski will face a particularly crucial period between 1985 and 1987, when it should be clearer to him that ad hoc policy measures, especially in the economy, cannot work. At that point he will have to decide whether simply to continue the march—relying on the security services to preserve order while he tries to force slow change on the recalcitrant bureaucracies—or to act more boldly to break bureaucratic logjams. [redacted]

Either course is likely to increase internal criticism and perhaps efforts to remove him. If he tries merely to ride out the problems, he will be accused of not finding adequate policies to meet the needs. He might try to compensate for the failure of economic policies by taking a tougher stand on the opposition or the Church, but such policies would carry their own costs. A more aggressive attack on economic problems, on the other hand, would certainly generate greater resistance from the bureaucracies. [redacted]

Soviet meddling could exacerbate the problems. In the coming years we believe the level of bilateral frictions will increase as Moscow becomes more frustrated at the slow pace of economic and political improvement. Continued Polish requests for economic assistance probably will burden the relationship, especially since Moscow is not likely to be responsive. The Poles are likely to continue parrying any extreme policy suggestions they consider politically dangerous, but Warsaw will be at an increasing disadvantage to the extent that relations with the West remain restricted. At some point the Soviets could overcome their concern about "rocking the boat" and support someone who they believe could better resolve Poland's problems. [redacted]

The peremptory removal of Jaruzelski as a result of internal fighting would have serious consequences. It would be followed, in our view, by the removal of other military officers, and this would create resentment within the Polish military. We believe a new leadership would be more hardline than Jaruzelski's which would mean that it would be less able to call on the Church for help in maintaining social calm. In fact, such a civilian leadership would be more inclined to attack the Church, thereby heightening tensions.¹⁹ [redacted]

Destabilization could also come from society as a result of prolonged economic frustrations.²⁰ Polish workers are not likely to accept quietly a prolonged stagnation or decline in their standard of living. The authorities must also be concerned that the youngest workers—politically educated during the Solidarity era—may be less inhibited in expressing demands and frustrations and more prone to violence. The natural tendency of the regime, when faced with escalating tensions, will be to reach for those methods they know best, that is, increased repression. But harsh measures seem more likely to backfire and lead to even greater resistance. Even the Church may become increasingly less effective in helping maintain order. Such an open escalation of tensions probably would endanger Jaruzelski's position even though he has successfully used force before and shown that riots accompanied by some deaths do not necessarily bring down a party leader. [redacted]

On balance, the current stalemate between the society and its rulers may not be broken for a long time. Memories and emotions from the turbulent but short-lived Solidarity era will not be erased easily. Perhaps neither the current leadership nor society's representatives, such as Walesa, will be able to overcome these memories to reach even a modicum of accommodation. Thus, the problems may be deferred for the next generation to resolve or to fight again. [redacted]

¹⁹ The prospects of a civilian leadership coming to power that would seek popular support by repudiating the crackdown on Solidarity are very remote. Such a stand would be vehemently opposed not only by most of the Polish establishment but also by Moscow. [redacted]

²⁰ The increasing frequency of Polish crises—1956, 1970, 1976, 1980—has led some Western scholars to expect a blowup sooner than later. [redacted]

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